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BACK TO THE FUTURE OF REGULATING ABORTION IN THE FIRST TERM
Tracy A. Thomas*
On the fortieth anniversary of Roe v. Wade, abortion and women’s reproductive
rights remained front-page news. In the preceding two years, states had accelerated antiabortion legislation and created new ways to restrict and discourage women’s exercise of
their constitutional right.1 The scope and extent of this legislation was unprecedented. In
2012, “19 states enacted 43 measures to limit abortion access. This was in addition to the
92 abortion restrictions enacted in 24 states in 2011.”2 As the director of the American
Civil Liberties Union’s Reproductive Freedom Project stated: “We’ve seen versions of
this—the sort of chipping away at Roe—for many years. But this year, instead of using a
chisel, they’re using a jackhammer.”3
This abortion activism was part of a larger attack on women’s reproductive health,
dubbed the “war on women.”4 As one commentator noted, “[s]tate by state, legislatures are
creating new obstacles to abortions and are treating women in ways that are patronizing
and humiliating.”5 Abortion rights advocates assumed that Roe had conclusively resolved
the question of the legality of abortion, protecting women’s right to privacy and choice in
the first trimester of pregnancy. 6 While technically, the core protections of privacy
guaranteed by Roe remain intact,” feminists believe “those protections are eroding because
of the constant onslaught by conservatives bent on undermining the rights of women.”7
“Relentless lawsuits, . . . even the patently baseless ones, make constitutionally protected
abortion rights appear as though they are up for discussion.”8
The deluge of new anti-abortion laws reaches far into the first trimester of
pregnancy and into Roe’s presumption of validity. “It’s as though legislatures all across the
country are saying, ‘We don’t really care. We’re just going to do it anyway in the face of
the Constitution.’”9 States have designed a wide variety of laws to erode this presumption.
A few states now require longer waiting periods of 72 hours between the clinic consult and
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1
WHO DECIDES? THE STATUS OF WOMEN’S REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS IN THE U.S., NARAL PRO-CHOICE
AMERICA, ANNUAL REPORT (Jan. 2012).
2
Kate Michelman & Carol Tracy, “Roe v. Wade” About Much More than Abortion, USA TODAY, Jan. 22,
2013; see also Julie Rovner, New Restrictions on Abortion Almost Tied Record Last Year (Jan. 19, 2012),
NPR HEALTH BLOG; Rachel Benson Gold & Elizabeth Nash, Troubling Trend: More States Hostile to
Abortion Rights as Middle Ground Shrinks, 15 GUTTMACHER POL’Y REV. 14,16 (2012).
3
L.J. Jackson, Friendlier State Legislatures Lead to a Rise in Anti-Abortion Legislation, A.B.A. J. 20 (Aug.
2011).
4
Tracy A. Thomas, Foreword, WOMEN AND THE LAW (Tracy A. Thomas, ed. West 2012).
5
Nicholas D. Kristof, When States Abuse Women, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2012, at SR11.
6
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
7
Michelman, supra note 2.
8
Molly Redden, Fetal Heartbeat Abortion Laws are Dangerous Even if Judges Reject Them, NEW REP., Mar.
28, 2013
9
Rebecca Boone, Idaho First State to Have Fetal Pain Law Rejected, AP, Mar. 7, 2013.
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the procedure.10 Mandatory disclosure laws, like that in South Dakota, require that woman
be told that “the abortion will terminate the life of a whole, separate, unique, living human
being,” that she “has an existing relationship with that unborn human being,” and that there
are increased risks of depression and suicide.11 Mandatory ultrasound laws require women
to view an image of the fetus.12 Hospital requirements for abortion providers and
procedures effectively shut down clinic access.13 Other states banned abortions outright at
twenty weeks.14 Fetal pain laws prohibit abortion around eighteen or twenty weeks on the
non-scientific basis that the fetus can feel pain.15 Heartbeat bills ban abortion after the first
heartbeat can be detected, which can occur as early as six weeks into the pregnancy.16
States ban abortions by prescription, either by prohibiting the use of RU40, the abortion
pill, or by circumscribing the ability of the physician to prescribe the medicine by
telephone. 17 Funding for abortion has been slashed by defunding Planned Parenthood and
restricting coverage under federal healthcare reform of the Affordable Care Act.18
10

E.g., S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 34-23A-56 (enacted 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-305(2) (eff. May 8, 2012);
NEB. REV. STAT. §§28–327 (West 2011).
11
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34–23A–10.1(1)(b), (c) &(e)(i) & (ii).
12
See Guttmacher Institute, State Policies in Brief: Requirements for Ultrasound (Dec. 1, 2012) (collecting
state laws); Heartbeat Informed Consent Act, H.R. 3130, 112th Cong. (2011); Nova Health Systems v. Pruit,
No. 110813, Okla. S.Ct. (Dec. 4, 2012) (striking down mandatory ultrasound law as inconsistent with federal
constitutional law); see also Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. REV. 351 (2008).
13
E.g., N.D. STAT. § 14-.02.1-04 (Mar. 2013); see Erik Eckholm, North Dakota’s Sole Abortion Clinic Sues
to Block New Law, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2013 (discussing laws requiring doctors to have local hospital
admitting privileges in North Dakota and Mississippi); Gary Robertson, Virginia Becomes Latest State to
Tighten Abortion Rules, www.reuters.com, Apr. 12, 2013 (noting hospital-style standards passed in Virginia,
Indiana, New Jersey, and Texas).
14
E.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1305 (eff. Feb. 26, 2013); OH. REV. CODE § 2919.18(B) (2011)
(prohibiting if physician determines fetus is viable); 2010 NEB. LAWS 1103 (2010). But see Isaccson v.
Horne, 2013 WL 2160171 (9th Cir. May 21, 2013) (striking down Arizona twenty-week ban as
unconstitutional); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F.Supp.2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013) (invalidating twenty-week
ban). The Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution and Civil Justice proposed a federal twenty-week ban
on abortion. Dorothy J. Samuels, War on Women Continues, Editor’s Blog, N.Y. Times (June 10, 2013).
15
“Ten states have enacted fetal pain laws since 2010. . . . Nebraska was first, followed over the next few
years by Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, and Oklahoma.” Boone,
supra note 9. See generally I. Glenn Cohen & Sadath Sayeed, Fetal Pain, Abortion, Viability, and the
Constitution, 39 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 235 (2001) (tracing development of fetal pain laws and questioning
their constitutionality).
16
North Dakota (March 15, 2013) (six-week ban); Arkansas Human Heartbeat Protection Act, Act 301, 89th
Cong., 20-16-1304 (Mar. 5 & 6, 2013)(banning abortion at twelve weeks if heartbeat detected in abdominal
ultrasound). See N.D. Governor Signs Nation’s Strictest Abortion Laws, USA TODAY, Mar. 29, 2013. A
federal district court preliminarily enjoined the Arkansas heartbeat law finding it “impermissibly burdened a
woman’s Fourteenth Amendment right to choose to terminate a pregnancy before viability.” Edwards v.
Beck, ___F.Supp.2d___, 2013 WL 2302323 *5 (E.D. Ark. May 23, 2013). Ohio’s Heartbeat Bill passed the
state House, but was not pursued in the Senate. See Ohio H.B. 125, 129th Sess. (2011–2012); Julie Carr
Smyth, Ohio Abortion Ban Would Use Heartbeat as Trigger, AKRON BEACON J. (Feb. 7, 2011 ); Jo Ingels,
Ohio House Approves Abortion Ban, REUTERS (June 28, 2011); Ann Sanner, Ohio Senate Puts End to
“Heartbeat” Abortion Bill, www.salon.com, Nov. 27, 2012. See also Jessica L. Knopp, The
Unconstitutionality of Ohio House Bill 124: The Heartbeat Bill, 46 AKRON L.REV. 253 (2013)
17
E.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.123 (eff. Sept. 2004); see Gold & Nash, supra note 2, at 16 (listing
Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota, and Tennessee); But see Okla.
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Courts have been conflicted over the legitimacy of these news laws. Initially, many
courts struck down the laws, recognizing them as blatant attempts to deny women their
constitutional rights of privacy and choice.19 As an unanimous United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in striking down a ban on abortion at twenty weeks,
because the early-term law “deprives the women to whom it applies of the ultimate
decision to terminate their pregnancies prior to fetal viability, it is unconstitutional under a
long line of invariant Supreme Court precedents.”20 The initial judicial determination,
however, was reversed in many cases upon further review by appellate courts that upheld
the new restrictions on abortion.21 Yet, even after reversal, one federal district court
continued on remand to assert that there was “little doubt” that the mandatory sonogram
law was an invalid “attempt by the Texas Legislature to discourage women from
exercising their constitutional rights by making it more difficult for caring and competent
physicians to perform abortions.” 22 Despite four decades of constitutional law, courts seem
resistant to women’s constitutional rights and their moral authority in early-term abortions.
This article contextualizes the recent aggressive anti-abortion legislation by
examining the backstory and historical context of two early U.S. Supreme Court cases
challenging abortion regulation in the first term: City of Akron v. Akron Center for
Coalition for Reprod. Justice v. Cline, No.110765, Okla. S. Ct. (Dec. 4, 2012) (invalidating law that
restricted use of abortion medicine).
18
Gold & Nash, supra note 2, at 16 (Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma and Utah); Michelman, supra note 2;
Jackson, supra note 3, at 20; see Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo Cty. Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 692 F.3d 343
(5th Cir. 2012) (upholding law defunding women’s health organization against First Amendment challenge);
but see Planned Parenthood of Central N.C v. Cansler, 877 F.Supp.2d 310 (M.D.N.C. 2012) (denial of state
or federal funds to organization was violation of First Amendment, Equal Protection, bill of attainder, and
preempted by federal law). See also Reproductive Parity Act, Wash. H.B. 1044 (passed April 2013)
(requiring all health insurers to cover elective abortions).
19
See Edwards, 2013 WL 2302323 *5 (enjoining Arkansas heartbeat bill); McCormack, 900 F.Supp.2d at
1148 (striking down hospital requirement for second trimester abortions and twenty-week ban); Planned
Parenthood of Minn. v. Daugaard, 799 F.Supp.2d 1048, 1064-66 (D.S.D. 2011) (enjoining preliminarily
South Dakota 72-hour waiting period); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F.
Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (declaring mandatory ultrasound law unconstitutional), overruled, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012); Nova Health Systems, No. 110813 (striking down mandatory ultrasound law); Okla.
Coalition for Reprod. Justice, No.110765 (invalidating prescription ban).
20
Isaccson v. Horne, 2013 WL 2160171 (9th Cir. May 21, 2013).
21
See Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., S.D. v. Rounds, 650 F. Supp. 2d 972 (D.S.D. 2009) (striking down
relationship and suicide disclosures as unconstitutional, but upholding biological disclosures of fetus as a
living human being), rev’d in part, 653 F.3d 662 (8th Cir. 2011) (upholding required counseling disclosures
of biology, medical risks, and parent/child relationship), partial hearing en banc, 686 F.3d 889 (8th Cir.
2012) (upholding suicide disclosure); Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d
570 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding Texas mandatory ultrasound law); Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Hidalgo, Cty.
Tex., Inc. v. Suehs, 828 F. Supp. 2d 872 (W.D. Tex. 2012) (granting preliminary injunction enjoining Texas
administrative rule that prohibited funding for organizations that provided abortion or any preventive health
and family planning services); 692 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 2012) (upholding law defunding women’s health
organization against First Amendment challenge).
22
Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 806 F. Supp.2d 942 (W.D. Tex. 2011) (finding
that mandatory ultrasound and display law violates free speech rights of doctors and patients); Tex. Med.
Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 2012 WL 373132, *5 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 6, 2012) (reluctantly
enforcing law); see also Jim Vertuno, Federal Judge Rejects Major Parts of New Texas Law on Sonograms
and Abortions, AP, Aug. 30, 2011.
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Reproductive Health (Akron),23 and Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health (Akron
II).24 Little has been written about these foundational cases. Yet at the time of the first
Akron case, the Supreme Court’s decision was “celebrated as the most far-reaching victory
on reproductive rights since Roe v. Wade.” 25 Now the arguments, strategies, and
motivations of the Akron cases have renewed relevance, as first-term regulations are fast
tracked through the judicial system and placed at the center of the ongoing debate over
abortion.
In Akron, the Court struck down invasive regulations it found were mere attempts
to discourage women from exercising their constitutional rights.26 The Akron ordinance
imposed seventeen different requirements including counseling, religious disclosures,
waiting periods, parental consent, and hospital requirements for abortion.27 The
comprehensive law was one of the first attempts to enact so-called informed consent laws.
These laws borrowed from the tort concept of informed consent requiring physicians to
inform patients of the medical risks of procedures.28 Anti-abortion groups endorsed these
laws “under the theory that a woman who was truly informed would choose not to
terminate a pregnancy.”29 Critics, however, argue that these abortion laws are perversions
of the tort law designed to protect a patient’s autonomy by interfering with that selfdetermination because of women’s assumed mental instability.30 The abortion informed
consent laws create a gendered exception to the usual rules of informed consent based
upon stereotypes of women, bias against abortion, and unsupported medical advice.31
Initially, the Court agreed with this, and accordingly struck down the transparent attempts
to discourage abortion in the Akron ordinance.32
The Court’s reaffirmation of Roe, however, was short-lived. Seven years later, in
Akron II, the Court changed the direction of its abortion jurisprudence, and upheld parental
notification and consent laws demonstrating a new tolerance for state regulation of
abortion in the first trimester.33 Despite the stewardship of the trial judge, Ann Aldrich, the
23

462 U.S. 416 (1983).
497 U.S. 502 (1990).
25
LEIGH ANN WHEELER, HOW SEX BECAME A CIVIL LIBERTY 148 (2013).
26
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
27
Id. at 422; see also Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron, 479 F. Supp. 1172, App. 1208–
13 (N.D. Ohio 1979) (reprinting ordinance in entirety).
28
See See Nadia N. Sawicki, The Abortion Informed Consent Debate: More Light, Less Heat, 21 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2011). See Maya Manian, Perverting Informed Consent, The South Dakota Court
Decision (Aug. 1, 2012), http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/08/01/perverting-informed-consentsouth-dakota (arguing that South Dakota is not the only state which misuses traditional principles of
informed consent to regulate abortion with laws that “are rife with mis-information and shaming rituals
masquerading as protections of a ‘woman’s right to know.’”); Sawicki, supra, at 1, 19; Evelyn Atkinson,
Comment, Abnormal Persons or Embedded Individuals?: Tracing the Development of Informed Consent
Regulations for Abortion, 34 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 617, 655 (2011).
29
Reginald Stuart, Akron Divided by Heated Abortion Debate, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1978.
30
Atkinson, supra note 27, at 618; Sawicki, supra note 27, at 3; Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman:
Informed Consent and Abortion Decision-Making, 16 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 223 (2009).
31
Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity
and Relational Autonomy, 37 AM. J.L. & MED. 567, 568 (2011).
32
Akron, 462 U.S. at 444.
33
Ohio v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 497 U.S. 502, 519–20 (1990).
24
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first woman appointed to the federal district court in Ohio, the implications of this law for
women was lost. The Court justified the restrictions as necessary to protect young women
from their inability to appreciate the “complex philosophical and psychological
dimensions” of abortion.34 This woman-protective rationale evolved into a primary judicial
justification for restricting abortion for all women, as the Court found that women
generally failed to understand the potential psychological and moral consequences of their
decision.35 The informed consent laws proved to be an effective way for pro-life groups
incrementally to whittle away at the right to abortion by creating obstacles and state
discouragement to a woman’s choice.36
This Article provides the backstory of the political and legal case in Akron,
capturing the public dispute over abortion that seized the locality and the attention of the
national media. Part I follows the case through its rocky path in the Akron City Council,
including the protests, demonstrations, and outrage that drove the legislation. Part II traces
the case through the trial court as the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) litigated the
case as a medical issue of scientific expertise and physician decision-making, rather than
one of women’s privacy. Part III then discusses the Supreme Court’s rejection of informed
consent laws and its reaffirmation of the core privacy right of Roe. The Article then
discusses the follow-on case of Akron II, when the state of Ohio again passes legislation on
parental consent and notification. Part IV explores the difference Judge Ann Aldrich, the
first female judge in the Northern District of Ohio, made to the consideration of abortion
laws, and the Supreme Court’s rejection of her analysis and its new tolerance for
restrictions of abortion in the first term.
This legal history offers insights and analyses gleaned from a review of the
historical record found in archives and long-forgotten files in dusty basements.37 It relies
on interviews with key players in the cases to fill in the story between the black and white
lines of judicial opinions.38 Revisiting the legal and factual details of the foundational
cases of first-term abortion regulation offers a more nuanced understanding of the
opposition to abortion and the unsatisfactory nature of the judicial compromises. For only
one thing is clear—that “the decision in Roe v. Wade neither started nor ended the debate
over abortion.”39

34

See id. at 519.
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159, 172 (2007).
36
Caitlin E. Borgmann, Roe v. Wade’s 40th Anniversary: A Moment of Truth for the Anti-Abortion-Rights
Movement, 24 STANFORD LAW & POL’Y REV. 245(2013).
37
See, e.g., Abortion, File of John Frank (on file with author); Archival Search File, Akron Beacon Journal
(on file with author).
38
Telephone Interview with Bonnie Bolitho, Director of Development, Planned Parenthood (June 29, 2010);
Interview with John Frank, former Akron City Councilman, in Akron, Ohio (June 21, 2010); Interview with
Stephen Funk, former law clerk to Judge Aldrich, in Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 12, 2010); Telephone Interview
with Stephan Landsman, Professor of Law, DePaul University (June 8, 2010); Interview with Lana Moresky,
former president, National Organization of Women, in Cleveland, Ohio (Feb. 12, 2010); Interview with
Robert Pritt, Attorney, Roetzel & Andress, in Akron, Ohio (June 18, 2010).
39
Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel, Reaction, in BEFORE ROE V. WADE: VOICES THAT SHAPED THE
ABORTION DEBATE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT’S RULING 81 (Linda Greenhouse & Reva Siegel eds.,
2010).
35
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I.

THE PERSISTENCE OF STRONGLY HELD BELIEFS

While many thought that Roe had resolved the legal question of abortion
regulation, the case instead became a trigger point for challenges to the compromise
respecting women’s rights. Resistance to the ruling became stronger as the practice of
abortion emerged from underground and was now publicly visible. The city of Akron,
Ohio, with a population at the time of 237,000, became one of the early battlegrounds over
challenges to Roe and its endorsement of abortion in the first term.40 The unlikely venue
was the Akron City Council. The locality was drawn into the national constitutional debate
because of the heightened awareness of abortion in the city due to the operation of four
abortion clinics.41 Women came to Akron from all parts of Ohio and neighboring states for
legal and affordable abortions.42 The public visibility of abortion in the city triggered a
reaction from the City Council, which was known for “reacting to social phenomena” and
threats to the social order, like video games, headshops, and rock concert crowds.43
The abortion regulation was instigated by leaders of the Greater Akron Right to
Life organization, Jane Hubbard, and Ann Marie Segedy.44 The National Right to Life
movement had grown beyond its original sponsorship by the Catholic Church in 1967 into
a formidable national movement incorporated as a political committee in 1973.45 In August
1976, the local Akron group petitioned the council to regulate abortion.46 Initially, the
Akron City Council rejected the proposed ordinance on the advice of the city law
department, which concluded the law was unconstitutional.47 The council did, however,
pass one change, a law requiring that abortions after the first three months of pregnancy be
performed in hospitals.48
A year later, the Akron Right to Life group proposed another, more expansive
abortion regulation.49 The group hoped to “persuade the Roman Catholic-dominated City
Council to consider adopting an abortion restriction that . . . would be the toughest in the

40

Stuart, supra note 28, at A10.
Id.; Bolitho Interview supra note 36.
42
Bolitho Interview, supra note 36; Iver Peterson, Akron’s 1978 Rules Were Enjoined Almost at Start, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 1982, at B4 (stating that according to the Akron City Health Department, in 1981 there were a
total of 7,685 abortions performed in Akron, 1,843 for Akron women and the rest were for women from
outside the city).
43
Peterson, supra note 40 (quoting the Deputy Mayor David Pagnard: “The fact is, it’s a part-time City
Council and they don’t have very much to do.” “They spend a lot of time reacting to social phenomena. It’s
something you get in small cities, and Akron is just big enough to have abortion clinics but small enough to
have this mentality.”).
44
Letter to the Editor, Ann Marie Segedy, Don’t Blame National Right to Life, AKRON BEACON J., June
1983.
45
See generally NATIONAL RIGHT TO LIFE, http://www.nrlc.org/abortion/facts/abortiontimeline.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2012).
46
Akron Council to Get ”Tough” Abortion Plan, AKRON BEACON J., Oct. 17, 1977, at B1 [hereinafter Akron
Council to Get “Tough”].
47
William Hershey, Legal Flaws Seen in Abortion Bill, AKRON BEACON J., Feb. 11, 1978, at A3 [hereinafter
Hershey, Legal Flaws].
48
Id.
49
Akron Council to Get “Tough,” supra note 43.

41
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nation.”50 The lawyer for the group, Alan Segedy, husband of the woman who had initiated
the demand for local regulation of abortion, drafted a proposed ordinance with Marvin
Weinberger, the chairman of Akron Right to Life, in consultation with national antiabortion legal experts.51 The Akron ordinance was intended as a model for national
restrictions on abortion and eventually was copied in twenty other states.52
As an “informed consent” law, the ordinance was designed to counter the assumed
“feminist rhetoric” and financial profit motives of the abortion clinics and convince women
not to have abortions.53 As Hubbard, the 29-year-old president of the Akron Right to Life
group described, “[t]he legislation’s main thrust is to ensure that a woman who decides to
abort her child will have when she decides scientifically and medically accurate
information: that the child she will abort is alive and growing, and that the procedure may
cause her physical or psychological harm.”54 She continued: “When someone realizes that
they are taking the life of a baby then they will realize that there are alternatives.”55
The Akron regulation had sixteen provisions designed to “protect a woman’s
health” during abortion.56 Its controversial provisions included parental consent for minors
under fifteen, parental notification for minors between fifteen and eighteen,57 informed
consent for all women, a twenty-four-hour waiting period, and counseling with highlydetailed medical disclosures about the procedure and biological disclosures about the
“unborn child.”58 Similar to sonogram bills of today, the mandated physician disclosures of
50

Stuart, supra note 28.
William Hershey, More Hearings Planned on Abortion, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 21, 1977, at C4 (noting
that local ordinance drafted in consultation with law professors Charles Rice of the University of Notre Dame
Law School and Joseph Witherspoon of the University of Texas).
52
See, e.g., Louisiana’s Stringent New Abortion Law Termed “Standard Bearer,” N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 1978,
at B6 (noting that the new legislation had passed almost unanimously and that the drafter of the legislation
had followed the Akron ordinance “right down the line.”)
53
Jane Hubbard, Letter to the Editor, Should City Monitor Abortion?, AKRON BEACON J., Nov. 21, 1977, at
A6.
54
Id.; see also Marvin I. Weinberger & Alan G. Segedy, Op-Ed., For Ordinance: ‘Would Protect Both
Mother and Child,’ AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 18, 1977 (quoting drafters of law that “[t]o insure truly informed
consent, the mother must be informed of the biological facts . . . . the alternatives to abortion . . . . [and] the
potentially grave physical and psychological complications”).
55
Hubbard, supra note 50.
56
Akron Ord. No. 160–1978, Chp. 1870, reprinted in Akron Ctr. for Reproductive Health v. City of Akron,
479 F. Supp. 1172, App. 1208–13 (N.D. Ohio 1979).
57
Id. at 1185–86. The ordinance provided an exception to the parental consent if the minor first obtained an
order “from a court having jurisdiction over her that the abortion be performed or induced.” Id. at 1201
(quoting Akron Ord. No. 160-1978 § 1870.05(B)(2) (1975)). However, because the municipality had no
authority to dictate the jurisdiction of the state courts, the trial court held that this provision was void. Id. at
1207–08.
58
Id. at 1186. The Akron ordinance also required abortions to be performed by a licensed physician;
prohibited abortions after 24 weeks unless necessary for the life or health of the woman, and in such case
required the attendance of a second physician dedicated to providing “immediate medical care for a child
born as a result of the abortion”; required maintenance of records of abortion and individual, detailed
abortion reports by the physician for each procedure; mandated open access for inspective by the Department
of Public Health at any time; prohibited abortions in municipal hospitals; included a freedom of conscience
exception allowing any hospital or employee to refuse to perform abortions; prohibited experimentation or
selling of a live or unborn child; and required post-abortion medical instructions. See id. at 1184-87 (citing
51
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the Akron law required a statement that “the unborn child is a human life from the moment
of conception” and “a detailed description of the anatomical and physiological
characteristics of the particular unborn child” at that point of development including
“appearance, mobility, tactile sensitivity including pain, perception or response, brain and
heart function, the presence of internal organs and the presence of external members.”59
Like counseling laws enacted in 2011, the Akron ordinance provided that “in order to
insure that the consent for the abortion is truly informed,” the physician must inform the
woman that the “unborn child might be viable and capable of surviving outside the woman
if more than 22 weeks,” that abortion is a major surgical procedure that can result in
serious complications, including “hemorrhage, perforated uterus, infection, menstrual
disturbances, sterility and miscarriage in subsequent pregnancies,” and that abortion “may
worsen existing psychological problems and result in severe emotional disturbances.”60
The city’s chief trial attorney, Willard F. Spicer, advised the council that the
ordinance was unconstitutional, stating “[t]here’s no question in my mind if the ordinance
was passed it would be knocked out (by a judge) very quickly.”61 Similar municipal
regulations were passed prior to the Akron law in Chicago and St. Louis, but had been
struck down as unconstitutional.62 And the parental consent provisions seemed directly
contrary to the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri
v. Danforth, which had struck down a similar statute just two years before.63 In light of
these recent precedents, Spicer advised the council against regulation and identified its
exposure to significant attorney fees and damages if it lost the case.64 Despite this legal
advice, the council proceeded with the proposed legislation.65
The proposed Akron abortion law triggered a series of heated, public meetings
before the City Council Health and Social Service Committee. The meetings attracted
several hundred people, despite the blizzard conditions in February 1978, when Akron was
Akron Ord. § 1870.01–1870.18) . Violation of the ordinance was either a first or third degree misdemeanor,
depending upon the specific provision violated. Id. at 1187. An earlier version of the ordinance prohibited
abortions after twenty-two weeks, required the pregnant woman to be shown pictures of an unborn child, and
required notification of the father of the unborn child. William Hershey, Akron Council Gets Milder Abortion
Bill, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 10, 1978, at A1; Charles Buffum, Abortion Bill Nearing Vote, AKRON BEACON
J., Feb. 23, 1978, at B1.
59
Akron, 479 F. Supp. at 1202–03 (quoting Akron Ord. § 1870.06(B)); Charles Buffum, Abortion: Thorny
Issue, AKRON BEACON J., Dec. 18, 1977, at G1 (stating that “unborn child” provision “would seem to outlaw
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covered by the “storm of the century.” 66 At the hearings on the abortion law, local
representatives from the National Organization of Women (NOW) and the specially
created Akron Pro-Choice Coalition led the organized opposition.67 Local and national
members of Right to Life groups led the organized support for the law.68 The committee
permitted the public to speak only at the first hearing.69 At the second hearing, the
committee heard from legal experts from Washington, D.C., Indiana, and Georgia, who
disagreed on the legality and constitutionality of the bill, and its informed consent
provisions.70 The third and fourth hearings considered testimony from medical and
psychological experts.71 One particularly controversial speaker was a national Right to Life
leader from Cincinnati, Dr. John C. Willke, who self-published the Handbook of Abortion,
considered the bible of the Right to Life movement. 72 Willke presented provocative
slides of fetal life at the hearing, triggering shouting matches in the hall and a walkout led
by gynecologists scheduled to speak..73 The county health director, Dr. C. William Keck,
testified against the bill.74 He argued that no further regulation was needed to insure quality
health care for women, as professional medical ethics and existing public health regulation
were more than sufficient.75
At the end of the day, the standing-room-only crowds seemed evenly divided on
the issue of abortion.76 But the contentious debate “served to divide further a community
already at odds over school desegregation and plagued by a declining job base as the tire
industry” withdrew from the city.77 Religious leaders stirred up their constituents, the
Catholic bishop actively lobbied his parish, and a Catholic principal and nun lobbied the
parents at her school.78 A minor fire was at the Akron Women’s Clinic nine days after a
fire at a Cleveland abortion facility put the clinic out of business, mimicking other fires
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and vandalism against clinics nationwide.79 Community groups on both sides of the issue
marched and demonstrated at city hall and elsewhere in town.80
Marvin Weinberger, an orthodox Jew and twenty-three-year-old law student, was
chairman of the Akron group Citizens for Informed Consent (CIC), and orchestrated the
local demonstrations and public relations efforts of the anti-abortion group. The press
described Weinberger as an “overzealous” and “aggressive man,”81 who used “little
stunts” to manipulate the media and attract publicity.82 He appeared on national
television, on NBC’s Today Show, debating Akron obstetrician, Dr. Linda Parenti.83
Locally, he orchestrated an all-night prayer vigil in frigid weather on the eve of the council
vote. Six hundred anti-abortion protestors attended the vigil at the Lutheran church across
the street from council chambers.84 On the day of the vote, 150 people overflowed council
chambers and hallway to hear the final forty-five-minute debate.85 Approximately thirty
protestors paraded outside of chambers, wrapped in blankets against the cold.86 The
national nightly news on all three television channels then in existence featured these
protests, making Akron the center of the national debate over abortion.87
The Akron city council passed the abortion resolution by a vote of seven to six.88
The lone Republican on the council, John Frank, voted against the regulation.89 Frank later
said he voted the way he did because of his own personal experience.90 Years before the
vote, his girlfriend had an unplanned pregnancy, and he believed the decision to continue
the pregnancy was hers alone.91 He supported her unilateral decision, even though he had
79
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not wanted a child, and was obligated to pay child support for the child she chose to
have.92 Frank believed that abortion was simply none of council’s business, and that it was
a woman’s decision whether or not to have a baby—period.93
Councilman Ray Kapper led the charge for passage of the law because he was
concerned the abortion clinics were preying on young girls, and that a lot of people weren’t
aware of “what kind of money those rip-off artists were making off teen-agers.”94 Kathleen
Greissing, a nurse and one of two women on the council, voted for the ordinance as an
assurance of “good quality healthcare” for women.95 The other councilwoman, Elsie
Reaven, voted against the law, and expressed her outrage that the “dominant male faction
in council had the arrogance to persist against all reason in burdening and possibly
encumbering women.”96 Mayor John Ballard refused to either endorse the bill with his
signature or register his opposition through veto, and the bill became law.97 City attorney,
Willard Spicer, predicted, “the ordinance just doesn’t stand a chance.”98
II.

MEDICINE AND MORALITY IN THE COURT

Three abortion clinics immediately challenged the Akron ordinance, represented by
attorneys from the Ohio chapter of ACLU.99 Clinic directors were concerned that the
ordinance’s provisions intimidated and harassed women, increased costs of the procedure,
and resulted in a loss of privacy for the patients.100 The president of the national Planned
Parenthood organization, Faye Wattleton, called the law “a savage threat to the emotional
and physical well-being of women who seek abortions.”101 The ACLU was “dismayed that
the advocates of compulsory continued pregnancy managed to persuade the Akron city
council to enact such a flagrantly unconstitutional and obnoxious ordinance.”102
The ACLU had become the “preeminent litigator on abortion rights” by the time of
the Akron challenge.103 In 1967, the National ACLU organization first adopted a policy
92
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endorsing the unrestricted right of a woman to choose an abortion before viability.104
Instigated by lawyer and board member Dorothy Kenyon, the ACLU National Board
joined the chorus of other groups that had begun to question the illegality of abortion in the
early 1960s.105 “The ACLU’s policy aligned it closely with the emerging women’s rights
movement, but attorneys who worked on ACLU abortion cases were not necessarily
governed by feminist instincts.”106 Board members, including the few women, did not
identify as feminists (meaning man-hating), but instead were motivated by broader
concerns of privacy.107 In 1972, the board voted to make the women’s rights agenda a
national priority, establishing Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s Women’s Rights Project, funded
with seed money from the Ford Foundation and Playboy.108
Abortion had not always been illegal. At common law, abortion was permissible
until the time of quickening late in the fourth month.109 States first criminalized it in the
mid-nineteenth century, concerned about the increase in abortions, injury to women from
surgical malpractice, lobbying by the medical profession , and anti-feminist beliefs against
women’s autonomy as child-bearers and midwives.110 In the 1960s, doctors and public
health officials became troubled by the tragic injuries and deaths of women from illegal,
back-alley abortions.111 As a result, in 1962, the American Law Institute proposed
therapeutic abortion laws that permitted doctors to perform abortions they believed were
justified for a woman’s physical or mental health.112 The growing feminist movement
adopted abortion as a centerpiece of its wider agenda for women’s rights.113 Feminists
connected their demand for women’s full economic and public participation with the
ability of women to remove the burdens of childbearing by controlling their reproductive
lives.114 By 1970, four states had legalized abortion, and courts in seven other states struck
104
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down their criminal statutes.115 In 1972, the American Bar Association (ABA) approved a
Uniform Abortion Act that would have placed no limitations on abortion during the first
twenty weeks of pregnancy, similar to the policy of the ACLU.116
In 1973, Roe v. Wade recognized a woman’s fundamental privacy right to choose
an abortion.117 The Supreme Court held that privacy rights inherent in the Constitution
protect a woman’s right to choose abortion as advised by her doctor.118 The Court rejected
the therapeutic approach in a companion case,119 but still viewed the abortion issue through
a medical lens. The majority opinion written by Justice Blackmun, a former counsel to the
Mayo Clinic, drew on medical science to accommodate both the woman’s privacy rights
and the state’s interest in protecting the fetus as it developed. The Court crafted a trimester
approach that divided pregnancy into three terms.120 The Roe Court held that no
governmental restrictions were permissible during the first term when the woman’s
fundamental right to choose an abortion was paramount.121 Thus much like the original
common law, Roe created a framework that permitted abortions until approximately the
time of quickening, but regulated abortions during the later terms of pregnancy. 122 Despite
Roe’s attempt at reconciling competing constitutional interests, state legislatures
immediately began to test the limits of the permissibility of abortion in the first
trimester.123
Building on this precedent, the ACLU litigated the Akron case as a question of
medical science and the rights of physicians. However, it did not follow its own national
policy of supporting abortion based on women’s autonomy, and the medical approach
instead had the effect of rendering women invisible.124 “Casting abortion as a medical
decision shifts the focus away from women . . . . [P]rotecting physicians’ rights provided
little or no foundation for according women rights. Indeed, it undermined women and their
rights by denying them the respect necessary to support their right of choice.”125 As Bonnie
Bolitho, counselor at one of the abortion clinics and a witness in the case later said, “It was
pretty clear to me that the vast majority of men involved in this were not interested in the
115
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lives of individual women.”126 The Akron trial was litigated by male lawyers, pursued by a
male plaintiff physician, grounded in the expert evidence of male physicians, lobbied in the
press by male leaders of the ACLU and Citizens for Informed Consent, reported by male
journalists, legislated by male council members, and decided by a male judge.127 Women
were relegated to the sidelines, even though the core issue in the case was their
fundamental right to self-autonomy.
The Akron case began quietly. “Although passage of the ordinance . . . resulted in
demonstrations on both sides of the issue, the opening day of testimony brought only a
handful of spectators to the federal building in Akron.”128 The federal district court granted
the plaintiffs’ temporary restraining order staying enforcement of the law.129 Trial was
delayed several months at the city’s request.130
The first litigation hurdle was finding a proper plaintiff. Pregnant women were
reluctant, and even afraid, to become plaintiffs in the case.131 One putative plaintiff, “Linda
Loe,” filed a motion detailing her fear from the publicity surrounding the case, and the
potential embarrassment and harassment because of the “personal nature” of the
proceedings.132 The trial judge refused to allow any pregnant woman or physician to
proceed anonymously under pseudonyms, as was commonly done in abortion cases.133
By then, anti-abortion fervor was strong in the community, as the brief in support
of the motion to proceed with pseudonyms explained, “[M]any citizens of Akron, Ohio,
have had a strong emotional reaction to the debate over the propriety of abortion.”134 The
brief detailed the “[m]anifestations of strife” that occurred, including regular public
demonstrations, threatening and harassing telephone calls and letters, and one act of
arson.135 Even plaintiffs’ lead counsel, Stephan Landsman, a professor at ClevelandMarshall College of Law, initially turned down the case because he did not want abortion
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demonstrations in front of his house.136 His wife, however, said “are you kidding me?,”
and convinced him to take the case.137 The case proceeded with the clinics and one named
physician as plaintiffs.138
The plaintiffs initially honed in on the religious motivations for the
law.139 They attempted to frame the case as a foundational question of
whether local legislatures were permitted to legislate on the basis of
religion.140 They argued the true motivation for the passage of the ordinance
was religious, and therefore in violation of the First Amendment’s
establishment of religion clause.141 The primary evidence of an
impermissible religious motive was the preamble to the ordinance.
WHEREAS, it is the finding of Council that there is no point in time
between the union of sperm and egg, or at least the blastocyst stage and the
birth of the infant at which point we can say the unborn child is not a human
life, and that the changes occurring between implantation, a six-weeks
embryo, a six-month fetus, and a one-week-old child, or a mature adult are
merely stages of development and maturation.142
The district court rejected the assumption that this clause was “clearly and
singularly a ‘religious belief.’”143 Judge Leroy Contie stated that an “individual’s belief of
when life begins can be based upon scientific or philosophical belief rather than
religious.”144 The judge refused to inquire into the actual motives of the legislators.145 He
acknowledged that
plaintiffs’ position may be that in the minds of the seven members of Akron
City Council who voted in favor of [the] Ordinance . . . the belief that
human life exists . . . is clearly and singularly a religious belief. If this is
plaintiffs’ position, they certainly failed to prove their case in this regard.146
136
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He also held that it would be improper to inquire into the actual “in fact” motives of the
legislators under existing law.147 Judge Contie found that there were numerous possible
secular purposes to the law, including “the state’s valid interests in maternal health and the
potentiality of human life” and thus did not present an Establishment Clause problem.148
The fact that the purpose coincided with a religious purpose was irrelevant.149
Judge Contie also expressly distanced himself and the opinion from the national
political controversy over abortion:
Analytically, however, this case is no different than the numerous others
that come before the Court. It is the duty of this Court to determine the
controversy before it based upon the requirements of the Constitution as
expounded by the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit. In considering the present case, this Court has attempted to do just
that, nothing more and nothing less.150
He added a footnote, quoting Justice Felix Frankfurter on the role of personal opinion in
judicial decision-making:
As a member of this Court I am not justified in writing my private notions
of policy into the Constitution, no matter how deeply I may cherish them or
how mischievous I may deem their disregard. . . . It can never be
emphasized too much that one’s own opinion about the wisdom or evil of a
law should be excluded altogether when one is doing one’s duty on the
bench.151
People assumed that Judge Contie personally opposed abortion because he was Catholic.152
A Nixon appointee, the conservative, Italian-American Contie was the first Northern
District judge to sit in Akron beginning in 1971, and was appointed in 1982 by President
Ronald Reagan to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit where he would
serve for thirty years.153 Contie was respected for his hard work, and generally considered
147
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by attorneys to be a “great judge.”154 “[H]e established a reputation as an industrious,
conscientious, and thoroughly professional judge.”155 Contie was also known as a “pretty
tough character.”156 He had served as law director for the City of Canton and was wellknown for his aggressive attack on local mafia crime and police corruption, which led to
the bombing of his home.157 Judge Contie “ruled in cases of great importance to the
community, from the desegregation lawsuit involving the Akron Public Schools to a sex
discrimination case against the former Akron National Bank.”158
With Contie eliminating the First Amendment claim, the case proceeded as one
about physicians and medical expertise. Justice Blackmun’s opinion in Roe, based on his
experience as general counsel for the Mayo Clinic, seemed to call for this type of
healthcare approach, as it conceptualized abortion as an issue of doctors’ care of their
female patients.159 The plaintiffs in Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. v. City of
Akron focused on the restrictions on the doctor’s medical decision-making.160 The
defendant city responded with medical appeals, arguing that concerns over maternal health
necessitated regulation.161 The case became a battle of the male experts.162 The plaintiffs,
supported by the national ACLU, presented top prestigious medical experts; indeed, one
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had received a Nobel Prize in the Physiology of Medicine.163 The defense experts,
proffered by the Right-to-Life intervenors who effectively led the defense case, proffered
less impressive witnesses who were more easily discredited on cross-examination.164
One year later, Judge Contie issued a compromise decision in the Akron abortion
case; both sides claimed victory.165 The local newspaper noted that “[b]y striking down
some sections and upholding others, he appears to have accomplished the impossible:
convinced both sides in the suit that they had won.”166 Anti-abortion leaders called the
ruling “terrific” and “a major victory for pro-life people.”167 Benson Wolman, executive
director of the Ohio ACLU retorted, “[a]nother such victory and they (the anti-abortionists)
will be permanently undone.”168 The decision invalidated parental consent, parental
notification, detailed informed consent, disposal requirements, and clinic inspection.169 On
the other hand, it upheld the 24-hour waiting period, the doctor’s explanation of risks and
procedures, the hospital requirement for second trimester abortions, and reporting
requirements.170 Contie’s approach was careful and measured. The court seemed to be
searching for a practical way to split the proverbial baby, constrained to follow the
commands of Roe, but resistant to the evolving concepts of feminist equality.171 An
editorial in the local paper thought “Judge Contie’s ruling should put an end to the
bitterness that has enveloped this controversy, and should, once more, demonstrate the
importance of the individual in determining a right that is so personal and private.”172
Early reactions to the decision by the City suggested that it would not appeal.173
“City Council President Ray Kapper (D-at large), a prime mover behind the legislation
said, ‘I don’t expect an appeal by the city. It’s over. We lost, we lost.’”174 He added, “[m]y
intent was to regulate clinics and it became an emotional thing which I would not like to
163
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see again.”175 “The court has spoken and I’ll abide by what the court has said.”176 Kapper
was defeated in the subsequent mayoral campaign and the new Mayor Roy Ray decided to
appeal the decision.177 Councilwoman Elsie Reaven was not surprised, as she had thought
Council would appeal the decision.178 “They don’t care how it tears up the community or
how much it costs. They are very narrowly single-minded.”179
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit overruled
Contie’s compromise.180 In a split decision, the appellate court invalidated most of the
Akron provisions, upholding only the parental notification and hospital requirements.181
The majority opinion criticized Contie for employing a less demanding judicial review
than that required by Roe for first trimester restrictions.182 Contie had failed to analyze
whether there were compelling interests for first-term regulations as required by the
Supreme Court in Roe, and instead analyzed the law under a less exacting test of whether
the regulations were unduly burdensome or rationally related to a legitimate government
purpose.183
The dissenting judge, Cornelia Kennedy, appreciated that the majority’s opinion
seemed to conform to Roe, but queried whether that opinion was still the controlling
law.184 She stated that “[l]anguage from the earliest abortion decisions supports the
majority’s conclusion that only a compelling state interest will justify significant first
trimester abortion regulation.”185 But she noted that “there appears to have been some shift
on the issue in the Supreme Court’s decisions . . . .”186 Indeed, this shift in the abortion
jurisprudence would become apparent when the Supreme Court granted certiorari in the
Akron case.
III.

AN ISSUE OF SUPREME IMPORTANCE

Akron remained in the national spotlight as the case proceeded to the United States
Supreme Court.187 But the tenor of the case was different at this level of the litigation. As
175
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Akron law director Robert Pritt noted, “[i]t’s a different world down here.”188 He
explained, “[o]nce you get away from the local political scene, you can concentrate on just
the issues, just the law.”189
Plaintiffs maintained their strategic focus on the legal rights of the physicians,
characterizing the Akron abortion ordinance as a “straightjacket on the physician.”190
Amicus briefs filed by the American Medical Association and other professional medical
associations bolstered this argument.191 Dr. James Breen, the president of the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, stated his concern that, if not overturned, the
law might serve to “[dictate] to the nation’s physicians how they are to carry out the
individual practice of medicine.”192 The plaintiffs supplemented their challenge with
arguments about the rights of women.193 They argued that the requirements of the Akron
law “rob[] the woman of independence in the abortion decision-making process” and “treat
women as irrational decision-makers who must be forced to reconsider their choice of an
abortion.”194
The Supreme Court definitively struck down the Akron ordinance, reaffirming its
abortion rights jurisprudence ten years after Roe v. Wade.195 “[T]he Court reached beyond
the Akron case, using the decision as a vehicle to make a very deliberate, very forceful
point.”196 Justice Lewis Powell, writing for the majority in a six to three decision, adhered
to stare decisis and followed both the spirit and rule of Roe.197 “[T]he Court repeatedly and
consistently has accepted and applied the basic principle that a woman has a fundamental
right to make the highly personal choice whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”198
188
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The Court applied heightened scrutiny to invalidate all of the ordinance requirements that
were appealed: hospitalization, parental consent, informed consent, disclosures, the 24hour-waiting period, and the disposal process.199 The majority found that these regulations
placed significant obstacles in the pregnant woman’s path and that the legislative
motivations went “beyond permissible limits.”200 The Court understood the impact of the
Akron law, stating: “[I]t is fair to say that much of the information required is designed not
to inform the woman’s consent but rather to persuade her to withhold it altogether.”201
Sandra Day O’Connor, the Court’s newest justice, dissented.202 She questioned the
premise of the Court’s abortion jurisprudence built on three distinct trimesters.203 In a nowfamous quote, she wrote, “[t]he Roe framework . . . is clearly on a collision course with
itself.”204 O’Connor argued for abandonment of the three-stage approach of Roe in which
regulations in the first trimester were evaluated under strict scrutiny and those for later
trimesters were evaluated under a rational basis standard.205 She found that the Akron case
illustrated why “the trimester approach is a completely unworkable method of
accommodating the conflicting personal rights and compelling state interests that are
involved in the abortion context.”206 Instead, she would have applied an “unduly
burdensome” standard throughout pregnancy that would ask whether the “regulation
rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.”207
The majority expressly rejected the undue burdensome standard as meaningless,
finding that it “would uphold virtually any abortion regulation under a rational-basis test,”
and indeed, O’Connor would have upheld all of the Akron regulations.208 Nevertheless, she
found the undue burden standard to be the appropriate test because the recognized
fundamental right of abortion was limited, and not absolute.209 She preferred resolving the
complex and extremely sensitive issue of abortion through the legislative process, but
brought. Id. Powell gained an appreciation for the practical implications of the legal issue of abortion and its
impact of people of different races and economic class. Id.
199
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explained that deference to the legislature was not the reason for her articulation of an
alternative standard.210
However, the government lawyers defending the abortion regulations had focused
on legislative deference in arguing for a more lenient constitutional standard of oversight
for abortion regulations. The Solicitor General for the Reagan Administration, Rex Lee,
suggested a more lenient “undue burden” standard.211 When Justice Blackmun, author of
the Roe opinion, called him out, asking, “Mr. Solicitor General, are you asking that Roe v.
Wade be overruled?,” Lee quickly backtracked, saying that “was an issue for another day,”
and that he was instead asking for deference to the legislature as the policymaking body.212
The lead attorney for the City of Akron, Robert Pritt, also defended the case on the basis of
legislative power, as embodied in the notion of local home rule.213 By the end of the long
case, however, he became concerned about the law on moral grounds and the “tremendous
amount of money” allegedly being made by the clinics, though many years later he
reflected on the fact that “maybe as a male I don’t get it and just can’t get it.”214
The Supreme Court’s decision in Akron was an enormous victory for women’s
rights, even as it was a “legal embarrassment for the Reagan Administration.”215 Linda
Greenhouse of the New York Times described how “the decision changed the framework of
the abortion debate.”216
It subtly shifted the burden of battle. Until last week, the burden was on
pro-choice advocates who were fighting to preserve the status quo. There
was always the argument that the Supreme Court in 1973 had not fully
understood the implications of what it was doing, that Roe v. Wade would
wash away like a sand castle under the relentless waves of hostile opinion.
Last week, when six men, whose average age is 73 and who have a
decade of reflection behind them, reaffirmed their initial stand, the
constitutional right to abortion became the status quo as it had not been
before. . . . With the decision, the right to abortion—exercised last year by
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1.2 million American women—entered the mainstream, and the burden
shifted to the other side to show why it should not remain there.217
On remand in the Akron case, Judge David Dowd, Contie’s successor on the bench,
awarded the plaintiffs attorney’s fees of $368,710.218 Councilman John Frank demanded
that Dr. Willke and the National Right to Life pay the city’s expenses; they refused,
politely thanking the city for its valiant anti-abortion efforts.219 The share of fees paid to
attorney Landsman at the Cleveland-Marshall College of Law was used for the Harry
Blackmun scholarship fund, named for the author of the Roe decision.220 Justice Blackmun
himself attended the dedication, lured to Cleveland by the promise of a much-beloved
baseball game with Cleveland Indians Hall of Fame pitcher, Bob Feller.221
IV.

CHANGING COURSE

The invalidation of governmental restrictions on access to abortion in the first term,
however, remained good law for only a short time.222 Just three years after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Akron, the Northern District of Ohio was again presented with the issue
of the constitutionality of an abortion law restricting access to minors.223 A 1985 state law
required a physician to notify one parent of a minor seeking an abortion.224 This time, the
case of a first-term abortion restriction took a different turn on its way through the Ohio
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courts to the Supreme Court. After an initial invalidation of the law by the lower courts,
the highest court upheld it and began to shift the applicable constitutional standards.225
A.

Procedural Defects and Predictable Effects

In Akron Center for Reproductive Health v. Rosen, the district court considered
another attempt at restricting access to first-term abortions.226 The state law made it a
crime for a physician, or other person, to perform an abortion for a minor woman under
eighteen years of age without parental notice or consent.227 It included a process for waiver
of notification if the minor convinced a juvenile court that she was mature enough to make
the abortion decision without her parents, that one of her parents had engaged in physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse against her, or that notification was otherwise not in her best
interests.228 The Akron Center for Reproductive Health, one of the parties from the first
Akron case, challenged the state abortion law by seeking to enjoin local prosecutors from
enforcing the law.229
Judge Ann Aldrich was assigned the case. Aldrich, relatively new to the bench,
granted the preliminary injunction, and later a permanent injunction, preventing
enforcement of the law.230 In reaching her decision, she first recognized that the Supreme
Court had held that requiring parental notification for immature, dependent minors seeking
abortions did not violate the Constitution.231 However, Aldrich concluded that the
precedent constitutionally mandated a valid judicial bypass procedure for parental
notification laws.232 Aldrich found numerous defects with the Ohio bypass provision
including its constructive authorization, physician requirement clear and convincing
225
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evidence confusing pleading requirements, and the lack of expedition and anonymity.233
Aldrich found the law had potential for “violations of the constitutional rights of mature
minors and minors for whom notification would not be in their best interests.”234
Aldrich was concerned about the practical effect of the statute.235 She found that the
evidentiary standard in the bypass procedure created “an unacceptably high risk of
erroneous determinations,” since “the judge’s decision will necessarily be based largely
upon subjective standards without the benefit of any evidence other than a woman’s
testimony.”236 As Aldrich had suspected, when the law later went into effect, many of the
judicial bypass decisions did in fact appear “to be at the whim of the judge.”237 One judge
denied a judicial exemption to a seventeen-year-old, despite evidence of physical abuse by
her father; another judge denied a bypass because a seventeen-year-old girl had not had
enough “hard knocks”; and a third judge denied the exception because the teenager refused
to file a paternity suit against her partner.238 Thus, Aldrich’s understanding of the practical
implications of the law informed her otherwise legalistic interpretation of the statutory
language.
Aldrich’s ruling was praised as a “constitutional victory of some great importance
for young women, for the privacy of their bodies, and for adult women and their
bodies.”239 But proponents of the law attacked the decision and Judge Aldrich herself. The
sponsor of the bill, Representative Jerome Luebbers of Cincinnati, said, “I don’t know that
she ruled in the right fashion, and it was not in tune with the feelings of the people of Ohio
and of the Legislature.”240 He continued, saying, “I fully expected that the judge would do
this. She’s predictable.”241 Judge Aldrich was perhaps “predictable” because she quickly
distinguished herself as one of the most liberal members of the court with a strong
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commitment to social justice.242 A framed needlepoint slogan hanging on the wall of her
chambers read: “Women who seek to be equal to men lack ambition.”243
B.

The Difference Gender Makes

The presence of women on the court can make a significance difference to the
outcome for women.244 Empirical work has shown that there are measurable differences in
voting patterns among judges in sex discrimination cases.245 Female judges are more likely
than male judges to decide in favor of the female plaintiff.246 The presence of a woman
judge also seems to influence her male colleagues and make them more inclined to vote in
favor of the female plaintiff.247 With Judge Ann Aldrich on the court, the potential existed
for litigants in gender cases, like abortion, to find a more receptive judicial audience.
Ann Aldrich was the first woman appointed to the Northern District of Ohio by
President Jimmy Carter in March 1980.248 Aldrich was only the second woman from Ohio
appointed to the federal bench, though it had been almost fifty years since Florence Allen
had been appointed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in 1934.249
Carter deliberately sought to increase the number of women and black federal judges
during his tenure, and he appointed 41 women to the bench during his four years in
242
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office.250 “Carter’s groundbreaking appointment of women judges was motivated by his
commitment to women’s equality as a human right” and to the importance of making the
judiciary more representative of the American citizenry.251 He replaced political patronage
and senatorial prerogative with citizen nominating commissions, merit selection principles,
and affirmative action principles to diversify the bench, both for sex and race.252 He was
aided by the passage of a new federal law that created 152 new judgeships in 1978.253
Despite Carter’s efforts, his success was limited to moving beyond tokenism, rather than to
full proportional representation, as even today, only twenty percent of federal and state
judges are women.254
The litigants in Judge Aldrich’s courtroom seemed to appreciate practical
difference a woman judge could make. Her law clerks often told a story from early in her
tenure.255 The case involved a sex discrimination suit filed against a municipality relating
to alleged discrimination in the hiring and promotion of the city's fire department
employees.256 The case had been previously assigned to a male judge, Thomas Lambros,
who was significantly shorter than the six-foot-tall Aldrich.257 At a status conference held
shortly after the case was re-assigned to Judge Aldrich, a member of the city council was
in chambers and asked whether Judge Aldrich would consider recusing herself from the
case.258 The reasons for the recusal request were not explicitly stated, but the implication
was clear, the council member wanted Judge Aldrich to recuse because she was a woman.
Without missing a beat, however, Judge Aldrich simply replied, “Why? Because I'm too
tall?”259
Aldrich was an imposing woman. Strong and resourceful, she had been on her own
since the age of eight when her mother died in a Rhode Island hurricane.260 She had an
interesting life, rebuilding railroad lines in Yugoslavia after World War II, racing Siberian
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huskies, and marrying a CIA agent, the first of three husbands.261 Aldrich was the only
woman in her law school class at New York University Law School, graduating second in
her class at the early age of twenty-one.262 She said that most of her classmates begrudged
her presence, believing she was only there to get a husband and taking a space from a
worthy GI returning from war.263 She continued her legal studies for advanced degrees,
worked on the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development in
Washington, D.C., and became a lawyer for the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) while raising four sons.264
As a private attorney, and later law professor, Aldrich focused her efforts on racial
265
justice. She represented the United Church of Christ and two black plaintiffs who sued
the FCC in 1964 to challenge the television license of the Mississippi NBC affiliate that
refused to show black people on TV or broadcast news about the black civil rights
movement.266 As the first tenure track law professor at Cleveland-Marshall Law School in
1968, Aldrich focused her efforts on developing the school’s diversity student recruitment
program.267 To recruit minority students, Aldrich drove to Mississippi to the historically
all-black teachers’ colleges of the South, and helped them through school, even allowing
some of them, like future Ohio appellate judge, Patricia Blackmon, to live at her house.268
When a judicial position was created in the Northern District of Ohio, women’s
rights advocates went into high gear, tirelessly working to include women in this
opportunity.269 The all-male judicial selection committee had initially met and proposed a
list of all men.270 The list was rejected because President Carter had explicitly requested
that the nominations include women and black candidates, departing from the historical
practice of relying on personal recommendations from the senior U.S. senator from the
261
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state.271 The nominating committee met again, and this time, with the input of women’s
rights lobbying, there were five women on the list.272 The female candidates were
primarily law professors since there were relatively few senior women lawyers in
corporations or law firms at that time with the length of legal experience required.273 While
the Ohio senators were only nominally supportive of the Committee’s efforts to include
women candidates, many years later, Senator Howard Metzenbaum made a point of saying
to Judge Aldrich, when he sat next to her on a plane, that he was proud of her nomination
and “job well done.”274
Aldrich encountered collegial difficulties and turmoil soon after she joined the
court. A year into her tenure, Aldrich accused the court’s chief judge, Frank Battesti, of
influence peddling, bribery, and kickbacks involving lucrative bankruptcy case referrals to
a firm where his nephew worked.275 Controversy was nothing new to Battisti. He had
served as chief judge for fourteen years, and “[had] drawn praise and angry criticism for
his handling of some of the most difficult cases of his time, from his dismissal of federal
charges against eight Ohio National Guardsmen in the 1970 Kent State shootings to his
busing order for the Cleveland school system.”276 In the process, he had become one of the
most powerful men in Cleveland.277 Accusations were hurled back at Aldrich calling her a
liar, and claiming she was lying to retaliate against her (much younger) lover, a member of
the accused firm, who had refused to marry her.278 A federal investigator on the case,
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however, doubted the revenge theory, stating: “She isn’t a woman scorned. She is very
much a federal judge who is concerned about the situation as she sees it.”279
The accusations shook the court and the legal community where “[e]ach
development and lurid rumor has fallen like a bombshell, creating large headlines and
sending shock waves through the federal courthouse.”280 The scandal diminished the
dignity of Cleveland’s federal bench, and one judge said, “I wish this were all a bad dream
and we could wake up and say it’s over.”281 Aldrich had attacked one of the most powerful
and controversial men in Cleveland, and she became “an outcast in the court.”282 A federal
grand jury investigation did not result in an indictment.283 The accused bankruptcy judge
resigned, the nephew relocated to St. Louis, and the boyfriend returned to his home in
Israel.284
Years later, Judge Aldrich joked during her honorary portrait presentation, that “[i]t
does appear that my portrait will be hung somewhere to the great satisfaction of my
colleagues, some of whom have been trying to hang me for the past two decades.”285
However, she distinguished her “current colleagues who are a totally different group than
my original colleagues.”286 Aldrich was very humble and tongue-in-cheek about her
legacy: “If things work out as usual for me, I will probably be lost in the basement . . . .”287
Reminiscing on her twenty years on the bench, she said, “I thought I was building a legacy
of an independent creative jurist,” but noted that her family and clerks “all seem to
remember me as Mrs. Nice Guy.”288
Aldrich’s judicial independence was evident on the face of her opinion in Akron II.
The opinion carefully considered all of the relevant Supreme Court authorities, and placed
them in their practical context to appreciate the ways in which the Ohio abortion law made
it more difficult for young women to exercise their rights.289 But Aldrich had not foreseen
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the jurisprudential shift that was taking place on the Court, calling into doubt the continued
viability of the past decisions on which she relied.290
C.

The Labyrinth of Obstacles

The United States Supreme Court was again asked to consider the constitutionality
of Ohio abortion regulations when the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed Judge
Aldrich’s decision striking down the law.291 The Sixth Circuit applied a strict scrutiny
analysis, and found the law to be a “procedural trap” with the six constitutional defects
Aldrich had identified.292 However, the majority of the Supreme Court chastised the
appellate court for basing its decision on a “worst-case analysis that may never occur”
when considering the facial challenge to the statute.293
The Supreme Court found that the key to the constitutionality of the law was the
adequacy of the judicial bypass option to parental consent.294 The Court extended its prior
precedent requiring bypass procedures for abortion parental consent laws to notification
laws, holding that procedures were needed “to prevent another person from having an
absolute veto power over a minor’s decisions to have an abortion . . . .”295 It then
concluded that the Ohio law satisfied the established criteria for a constitutionally valid
statute.296 The Court found the Ohio bypass procedures satisfied “the dictates of minimal
due process,” and saw “little risk of erroneous deprivation under these provisions and no
need to require additional procedural safeguards.”297
Justice Blackmun vigorously dissented.298 He found that Ohio “acted with
particular insensitivity” in creating a procedurally “tortuous maze” and unfair
“labyrinth.”299 He concluded that the statute deliberately placed a pattern of obstacles in
the pregnant minor’s path “in the legislative hope that she will stumble, perhaps fall, and at
least ensuring that she ‘conquer a multi-faceted obstacle course’ before she is able to
exercise her constitutional right to an abortion.”300 He found the challenged provisions to
be merely “poorly disguised elements of discouragement for the abortion decision.”301
290
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At oral argument, counsel for the plaintiffs, Linda Sogg, tried to make these
practical points about the effect of the law and how it “stacks the decks” against minor
women.302 But Sogg’s shrill voice and presumptuous argument failed to appreciate the
lack of support for her position among the justices and the tenuousness of the past abortion
jurisprudence.303 Counsel for the Ohio Attorney General, Rita Eppler, more persuasively
presented her argument supporting the law, arguing formalistically that the law was a
reasonable approach that balanced the rights of minor women against the rights and
interests of their parents.304
A plurality of the Court went on to conclude that the regulation did not impose an
“undue burden” on a minor seeking an abortion, applying a lower level of judicial scrutiny
than had been applied in Roe v. Wade and other precedent.305 Four Justices found that the
law was a rational way for the state to regulate its health professions, to respect family
dignity, and ensure that a young woman receives guidance from her parent.306 Kennedy
opined:
A free and enlightened society may decide that each of its members should
attain a clearer, more tolerant understanding of the profound philosophical
choices confronted by a woman who is considering whether to seek an
abortion. Her decision will embrace her own destiny and personal dignity,
and the origins of the other human life that lie within the embryo. The State
is entitled to assume that, for most of its people, the beginnings of that
understanding will be within the family, society’s most intimate association.
It is both rational and fair for the State to conclude that, in most instances,
the family will strive to give a lonely or even terrified minor advice that is
both compassionate and mature.307
This undue burden standard applied by Justice Kennedy in Akron II, and first
suggested by Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Akron I, was adopted by a controlling plurality
It is as though the legislature said: ‘“If the courts of the United States insist on upholding a
limited right to an abortion, let us make that abortion as difficult as possible to obtain’
because, basically, whether on professed moral or religious grounds or whatever, ‘we
believe that is the way it must be.’”
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302
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of the Court two years later in an opinion written by O’Connor in Planned Parenthood v.
Casey.308 The Casey Court adopted a lower standard of constitutional scrutiny than had
been used in prior cases, which resulted in greater accommodation of government
restriction of abortion.309 Under this more lenient standard, the Court upheld an informed
consent provision and a twenty-four-hour waiting period, but struck down a spousal notice
requirement.310 The Court identified the protection of a minor’s mental health from the
psychological risk that she might later regret her abortion as an important government
interest justifying the regulations.311
Fifteen years later, the Court extended this protective rationale to all women in
Gonzales v. Carhart.312 Carhart upheld the federal Partial Birth Abortion Act that banned
a rarely used late-term abortion procedure.313 The Carhart Court held it was important to
protect adult women from the alleged mental and emotional consequences of their decision
to have an abortion.314
In response, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg issued perhaps her most scathing
dissent.315 She deconstructed the rationale of “protecting women,” revealing that it
“reflects ancient notions about women’s place in the family and under the Constitution—
ideas that have long since been discredited.”316 Scholars have elaborated on her point that
the Court’s abortion decisions reinforce stereotypes about women’s primary role as
mothers and the assumed irrationality of their decision-making — normative concerns of
gender that reached beyond the issue of abortion.317 This was the same argument plaintiffs
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in the first Akron case had subtly argued to the Supreme Court. 318 In Carhart, Justice
Ginsburg took the opportunity, for the first time in an opinion, to justify the right to
abortion “squarely in terms of women’s equality rather than privacy.”319 She rejected the
medical model that has dominated much of the Court’s forty years of abortion
jurisprudence in favor of a women’s rights model that engenders the constitutional right of
equal citizenship and better captures the understanding of the abortion right widely shared
in the women’s movement in the years before Roe.320
It may be that Justice Ginsburg’s analysis provides the outline of a way to legally
evaluate first-term abortion regulations going forward. Given the Court majority’s
acceptance of justifications for abortion laws based on stereotypes of women’s incapacity,
weakness, and need for protection, a sex equality analysis that focuses on the
discriminatory premises for such stereotypical protectionism may more directly address the
concerns of women’s advocates.321 This more searching inquiry may be required to better
respond to the continued legislative attacks on women’s right to choose abortion at some
time during a pregnancy.
V.

CONCLUSION

The types of governmental restrictions that were first challenged in Akron shortly
after Roe’s decriminalization of abortion have since become legal. Ohio, like many other
The problem with woman-protective antiabortion argument is not simply that it would treat
individual women on the basis of generalizations about the group, or the stereotypes about
women’s capacity and women’s roles on which the argument rests. . . .Like old forms of
gender paternalism, the new forms of gender paternalism remedy harm to women through
the control of women. Abortion restrictions do not provide women in need what they need:
abortion restrictions do not alleviate the social conditions that contribute to unwanted
pregnancies, nor do they provide social resources to help women who choose to end
pregnancies they otherwise might bring to term.
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states, has re-enacted the specific abortion restrictions that had previously been declared
invalid.322 The fierce public debate surrounding abortion, continuing over decades and
even centuries, reveals the depth and strength of the convictions held by those on both
sides of the issue. These convictions are not easily silenced by a single court decision.
Instead, both women’s rights activists, and anti-abortion proponents have continued to
press the courts for more acceptable resolutions of the issue. The Akron and Akron II
informed consent cases bring us back to the grassroots nature of the issue that reveals the
personal and political nature of the abortion issues that stands apart from its codification in
lofty constitutional doctrine. The law is being shaped by these grassroots efforts, just as
these pressures force the continued re-examination of an issue that never seems to be
settled satisfactorily.
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